Conference Between Bose and the Reich Foreign Minister in Vienna, 1 May 1941

No. 425 67/47245-66

Memorandum by an 0fficial of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat

RAM 26                                                                                                                 

BERLIN, May 1,1941.

RECORD OF THE CONFERENCE BETWEEN THE REICH FOREIGN MINISTER AND INDIAN NATIONALIST LEADER BOSE IN THE HOTEL IMPERIAL IN VIENNA ON APRIL 29, 1941.

With regard to the Reich Foreign Minister's question about the present situation in India, Bose answered that the Indian people were anti-British, to be sure, but were entirely without weapons and that therefore the small English Army could easily dominate the whole country. The Foreign Minister replied that one of the most noteworthy results of modern weapons developments was the fact that a small military power which was very mobile could, with very limited means, hold great areas in check. He cited several examples of this from the history of the present war.

Bose mentioned in this connection mutinies which had occurred in various Indian regiments. One regiment had mutinied in Egypt, and several others had refused to permit themselves to be shipped from India. Although these were only sporadic incidents, it could be said nevertheless that the time was certainly psychologically ripe for a great mass movement in India.

After the defeat of France, moreover, the morale of the English in India had been extremely low. English firms had taken Indian names as camouflage and had transferred their administrative staffs to newly erected buildings in the mountains of India. Commercial circles had also been extremely depressed by the air attacks on London. Only the English victories in Africa had again raised the morale of the English in India.

To the Foreign Minister's inquiry about Gandhi's attitude and the tactics he was pursuing, Bose replied that Gandhi did not wish to shut the door in the face of the English. He was a man of compromise, and when the war broke out he had in the first rush of sentiment spoken in favor of assistance to England. After a conference with the Viceroy he had passed the word that the Indians should not "hamper" the English conduct of the war. [V.A. Johnstone-Hope, Marquess of Linlithgow.] This statement of Gandhi's had been quite unexpected for the masses and had occasioned unrest, revolts, and insurrection among them in the whole country.

He (Bose) himself had spread propaganda throughout the country and spoken at numerous meetings from the time the war started until he was arrested. Accompanied by the approval of his listeners he had always upheld the thesis that in destroying England the F hrer was also working for India and that therefore the Indians ought to hope for his victory. Surprisingly enough the English had let him go his own way for quite a while before arresting him; he had really expected that after every meeting at which he had spoken. During the first months of the war the English had not dared to touch the prominent Indians.

When the Foreign Minister asked about the political organization of the Indian nationalist movement, Bose answered that a party-like organization with wide ramifications extended over the whole country.

To the Foreign Minister's question about the number of troops stationed in India, Bose replied that there were available about 70,000 purely English troops and 180,000 Indian troops, thus about 250,000 men in all, who were reasonably well equipped. The English had the intention of conscripting another 500,000 Indian troops. So far, 100,000 men had been gathered within a year and a half with great difficulty; they were mainly employed in Egypt, the Near East, and Hong Kong. If there were appropriate Indian counterpropaganda the English would find it difficult in these circumstances to attain the figure of 500,000 men.

At a question by the Foreign Minister about the attitude of the maharajas, Bose replied that they were aiding the English, to be sure, but much less than in the World War. They were providing money more than anything else.

Gandhi had made the mistake of believing that under the pressure of the war England would prove to be more accommodating toward the Indians. The opposite had occurred. The English policy India was more conservative and reactionary today than ever before. Among other things this was also evident from the fact that progressive industrialization of the country was carried out excessively with British capital, while Indian participation was being curbed. The Indians therefore feared that if England survived defeat she would institute a new wave of anti-Indian policies. On the basis of their exact knowledge of the English character which the Indians had gained as a result of living with the English for long, and on the strength of certain experiences made in the past, they knew that the English might accept a defeat, but that immediately thereafter they would make preparations to regain the terrain. They would also do this in the case of India.

The Foreign Minister replied that the English had gone too far and it would be all over with them this time. They, too, were beginning to realize this. Some time would pass, however, before it was quite clear to them.

To a renewed question by the Foreign Minister as to whether the Indian nationalists possessed a political party organization Bose answered that there was a political party and even a kind of SA. When the Foreign Minister remarked that armed resistance was probably out of the question, Bose replied that after the defeat of France the Indian regiments had lost their faith in England. A good deal of doubt had arisen among the Indian officers, many of whom were nationalists, and they listened very attentively to the news broadcasts sent from Berlin in Hindustani.

The Communists were of little importance, especially in view the fact that the nationalists had incorporated into their own program important points of the Communist program.

When the Foreign Minister asked what would happen if the English should leave India, Bose answered that then a nationalist government would be formed. He explained in this connection that the religious difficulties that were being artificially exaggerated by England could also be eliminated. He pointed to the extremely bad constitution which the English had given India and which, for instance, made it impossible for a Mohammedan to elect him (Bose), even if they held the same political opinions, simply for the reason that Bose belonged to a different religion. Furthermore, if the English regime came to an end the Army would of course disintegrate, and there would be some difficulty in bridging the time until the English officers who left could be replaced by newly trained Indian officers.

Thereupon the Foreign Minister asked about India's attitude toward Germany. Bose answered that he wanted to admit in all frankness that feeling against the National Socialists and the Fascists had been rather strong in India. For the English and Communist propaganda had upheld the thesis that National Socialism and Fascism were striving to dominate the other races.

The Foreign Minister interjected at this point that National Socialism merely advocated racial purity, but not its own rule over other races. Racial purity was also valued in India and conformed, moreover, to the laws of nature.

Bose went on to state that in their propaganda toward the Indians the English took the stand that the English rule might be unsatisfactory, to be sure, but German rule would be infinitely worse for India. With this slogan they indeed had been successful with the Indian masses. Not until after the German-Russian Pact was concluded did the mood change. Many Indians had greatly welcomed this Pact by reason of their social and anti-imperialist views and as a result they had arrived at a different attitude toward Germany. India knew, moreover, that without a close connection with a gnat power she could not exist, and therefore she was now entirely willing to align herself with Germany and Italy. He had to stress, however, that in order to win over the Indian masses completely it was very important to obtain an open declaration from Germany in advance stating that a German victory would result in the liberation of India.

Further on in the conversation the Foreign Minister asked about India's attitude toward Japan. Bose answered that owing to Japan's anti-British stand India had a benevolent interest in Japan. Moreover, India would greatly welcome a settlement of the Sino-Japanese conflict; because of her anti-imperialist attitude she was also pro-Chinese. India would greatly welcome a Japanese advance against Singapore because she would regard this as a severe blow against England. Trade with Japan was extremely important for India, even though the Imperial preference system caused difficulties here; 70 percent of the entire English trade went to India. Therefore it could be said that the Empire was synonymous with India and if India were torn away from the British Empire, the Empire as such would no longer exist.

Concerning Afghanistan, to which country Bose had fled from India and where he had stayed for some time, he related that the country was ruled by a family regime. Ninety percent of the population rejected the present Government. Amanullah was very well liked and if he should return would be received joyfully. [Amanullah Khan, Amir of Afghanistan from 1919 until his forced abdication in 1929.] When the Foreign Minister asked about Afghanistan's armed forces, Bose replied that one could not give any exact information on that point. The extent to which the "large number of people in uniform who were paid by the Government" could be considered an army or possessed the value of an army was doubtful. The present Government was under the influence of the English, even though from time to time it seemed to act in a somewhat more independent way. Afghanistan was afraid of Russia. The people were against Russia, mainly for ecclesiastic-religious reasons.

When the Foreign Minister asked about India's attitude toward Russia, Bose answered that on account of the anti-imperialist attitude of the Indians the Soviet Union enjoyed a certain sympathy.

Otherwise, the only thing the Indians feared was that there might be a compromise between England and Germany and that England might survive her defeat. The Foreign Minister replied that Germany was resolved to settle matters now once and for all. He then brought up once more the question of India's possibilities for resisting the English. It was clear that for an unarmed country it would be extremely difficult to do anything against the occupation army. Perhaps, however, it might be possible to prepare the ground and organize the resistance from within the armed forces themselves. For the troops had weapons and were trained. In this connection he asked Bose whether the Indian troops were also trained as military specialists. Bose answered in the affirmative, with respect to the time since the beginning of the war. Before that time the technical troops had mainly been composed of Englishmen.

Later in the conversation the Foreign Minister explained to Bose the F hrer's plans for a new Europe without England; this would be a contented Europe in which no one would play off anymore the separate countries against one another as England did with the various ethnic and religious groups in India and as she had so far been doing in the Balkans. In the new European order the countries would be grouped around the Axis and especially Germany as the center of power; and under the protection of this center of power they would not be played off against one another but would confidently cooperate with one another.

For a disarmed country like India it would naturally be difficult to undertake anything. Nevertheless, passive resistance could be practiced and an organization founded which would be ready for action at the decisive moment. The question now was whether it would be possible to influence the course of developments in India by propaganda.

Bose answered that the propaganda campaign of the nationalists extended to the civilian population, the Army, and the unsubjugated tribes along the Afghan border. The Indians, indeed, regarded this area, as a kind of base for an offensive. If a simultaneous attack were carried out by all of the tribes living there, the main part of the Indian occupation army would be withdrawn from the country. Then the moment would have arrived for an open revolt by the civilian population within the country itself. Bose termed the defeat of the 70,000 Englishmen along with their supporters within the country as quite within the realm of possibility. The Foreign Minister said that it seemed to him very probable that India would achieve her freedom in the course of this war. He was quite sure of this. Bose suggested in this connection that the Indian prisoners of war in German hands be utilized as tools of the Indian insurrectionary movement. These prisoners would doubtless express their willingness to fight against England immediately, and if this were made known in India it would have a very strong effect on the rest of the Army. The English would then lose most of their confidence in the Indian troops and would not be able to employ them as unconditionally as they did now.

Then the Foreign Minister sketched for Bose the development of German-English relations. For many years the F hrer had tried to maintain friendly relations with Great Britain. This had been one of the basic principles of his foreign policy, for the realization of which he had worked. When National Socialism came to power the Fiihrer had repeatedly sent the Foreign Minister to Great Britain, most recently as Ambassador of the German Reich, to promote a rapprochement. [Ribbentrop had been Ambassador in Great Britain from 1936 to 1938.] In this capacity he had done his very best to assure friendship with England. He had made Great Britain offers of friendship, cooperation, and even of alliance. The basis for these offers was that Germany would have supremacy in Europe and in return not meddle in any way in the affairs of the British Empire. This had been the German policy before the war. Germany had hoped that England would be reasonable and for her part, too, adopt such a policy. England had not recognized her opportunity, however. Overestimating her own power, she had not realized that she had already forfeited her leading position in the world during the previous war. And now she wanted to maintain this position, which actually had been lost, with the help of the old doctrine of the balance of power. In this she had been 100 percent wrong. She had thought that Hitler would fade from the scene for both political and economic reasons. When England saw that neither of these hopes was being fulfilled she pursued a policy of preparing for war and isolating her future opponent, and then at the given moment finally declared war on Germany. Even after the outbreak of the war, at the end of the Polish war, and after the French collapse the F hrer made speeches which amounted to offers to England. [Apparently a reference to Hitler's speeches of Oct.6, 1939, and July 19, 1940: see Editor's Notes, vol. VIII of this series, p.227 and vol. X of this series, p.249.] In her arrogance and stupidity, however, England had rejected F hrer's hand. Thereupon he had resolved to fight the matter out. The F hrer now intended to fight the war to the end. In Germany the conviction prevailed that the war was already won. There was no power that could still contest Germany's victory. No one confronted her any longer in Europe. Wherever resistance appeared it was smashed at once, so that the position of the Reich on the Continent was absolutely secure.

England found herself in a difficult situation. The island was being destroyed to a constantly increasing degree by air attacks, and even though the English tried to throw dust into the eyes of the world it was becoming increasingly known how terrible the conditions in the country were.

Submarine warfare had just begun and would be considerably intensified. The German submarines would swarm around the English Isles like sharks. It was extremely dangerous today to approach Great Britain.

England's hope, and her only hope, was America. The American affair, however, was the greatest bluff in the history of the world. At the end of the year America would find herself isolated at the side of her collapsing British ally. If America should enter the war she would immediately be confronted by Japan, too. In an encounter between the American and the Japanese Navies, however, the odds were 10 to 1 that the Japanese fleet would be victorious. The Japanese would be enthusiastic if a fight developed. Their only fear was that the American fleet might not dare to go beyond Honolulu.

On land America could not help England in any way either in Europe or in Africa. There was absolutely no problem in the European-African hemisphere that Germany could not solve. A landing of foreign troops here was naturally out of the question.

America claimed to be able to support England with airplanes. But the question immediately arose whether these American planes would ever even reach England, and if they did whether they could remain undamaged at the airfields. Furthermore, German production capacity was so superior even to the combined capacity of America and England that every basis was lacking for effective American help in this field.

Germany's foes spoke of her shortage of raw materials and foods. The Foreign Minister termed this assertion absolutely ridiculous. If it were a question of raw materials Germany would be able to carry on the war for 200 years, and with regard to the food situation, difficulties had to be surmounted only in a few places at the most, especially in the line of fats. But here, too, the situation was constantly improving by virtue of more thorough organization.

Germany was striking at England wherever she could get in a blow at the British Empire. If there were certain possibilities in India in this regard, the Foreign Minister wished to examine them, and to do so in a sober spirit without any illusions so that no mistakes would be made.

Under State Secretary Woermann had already spoken to him, the Foreign Minister, of the plans which Bose himself had. [See documents Nos.300 and 323.] In these circumstances the Foreign Minister would suggest that Woermann remain in close contact with Bose and continue to study the conditions together with him, and that in the near future there be another conference between the Foreign Minister and Bose concerning very close cooperation. [Ribbentrop did not see Bose again until Nov.29, 1941. See vol. XIII of this series.]

The important thing in the Indian question was to choose the proper time for the actions which might be undertaken. Caution would have to be exercised, for that was the only way in which something effective could develop both with respect to the German-English war and to the cause of Indian freedom. If something were done at the wrong moment this could lead to consequences which were the exact opposite of the aim being followed. Therefore action would have to be taken step by step and not too hurriedly.

In order to avoid opposition in India herself they would always have to take Gandhi into account. It would be wrong to do things which would give the English a chance of bringing Gandhi into opposition to Bose. The latter would have to feel his way very carefully, therefore, and consider in what way the propaganda campaign could best be started.

Later in the conversation the Foreign Minister suggested in particular that technical questions be studied, for instance whether there were enough transmitters available and whether illegal transmitters should be employed. In any case, a policy of pinpricks should be avoided in this respect, too, for this would only serve to arouse resistance to the campaign. In view of the adroitness of the English they could not afford to expose themselves, but the propaganda should go beyond the purely negative and be of a positive and aggressive sort. Bose was very agreeable to these suggestions. He advocated an illegal transmitter (free India station) which would be directed toward the three groups he had already mentioned: the civilian population, the army, and the insurrectionary tribes along the Afghan border; he expressed himself very hopefully regarding the effect of this propaganda, especially now that India had been assured of her liberation by the Axis Powers and knew that the English no longer had any prospect of victory. [In English in the original.]

Furthermore, in order to influence the rebellious tribes he would send agents to this area with propaganda instructions. It was important, however, that the British Empire be destroyed in all circumstances. The Foreign Minister answered that the English would certainly not give up the fight before they had been entirely crushed, and then it would probably be too late to save the British Empire.

In conclusion the Foreign Minister stressed the confidential nature of the conversation and promised another conference with Bose after further examination of the questions involved. If possible, Bose's presence in Germany must not become known. Therefore he would see that suitable quarters were made available to him outside Berlin. Bose answered that in his opinion the English were not aware that he was in Germany. At most they would have information that he had left India.

For the rest, they had degenerated to an inconceivable degree, as regards for both character and intelligence. The present Viceroy was extremely limited intellectually and his subordinates were entirely lacking in character and courage, the qualities which had distinguished the English in India in former times.

After a short exchange of opinion on Churchill's extremely foolish speech of recent date the conversation came to an end. [This may be a reference to Churchill's radio broadcast of Apr.27 to Great Britain and the Empire in which he reviewed the war situation. For text see Keesing's Contemporary Archives, 1940-1943, pp.4587-88.]

(SCHMIDT)

From: US Department of State. Documents on German Foreign Policy, 1918-1945. Series D (1937-1945). Vol. XII. The War Years February 1-June 22, 1941. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1962, 670-678.