Woermann comments on Bose's Memorandum on German-Indian Cooperation, 12 April 1941

No. 323 195/139132-34
Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department

IMMEDIATE                                                                                                       

BERLIN, April 12,1941.
U.St.S. Pol. No. 299

To the Foreign Minister's Secretariat with the request that it be forwarded and submitted at once to the Foreign Minister. Foreign Minister's Secretariat, Special Train Heinrich, is requested to see to it that the Roman numerals of the individual sections in the German translation of the memorandum are corrected in accordance with the English text (for III, IV, V, VI, VII, substitute II, III, IV, V, VI).

Bose asked me today to refrain for the time being, from making an announcement of his stay in Germany in the press and from arranging radio speeches, for the following reasons:

If it were possible to come to an agreement concerning the program of action he has submitted, he would remain in Germany during the war and carry on his fight from here. If, however, no agreement concerning his program could be arrived at, he intended to go to the Indian border area in order to fight from there. In this case it was not advisable that his stay in Germany became known, because it would make his fight on Indian territory more difficult. I believe that one should consider these misgivings of Bose's. [Woermann had made suggestions to this effect in a memorandum of Apr.11 (195/139135-36).]

The following is to be said with regard to Bose's memorandum:

Regarding point I: Work in Europe.

1. Compliance with Bose's plan would mean that we would announce the liberation of India from English rule as a war aim. It is doubtful whether the moment has arrived for doing this in an official form.

2. The establishment of a free Indian government in Berlin under Bose's leadership would mean that we make a certain political group, namely the leftist Forward Bloc, the exponent of India. This group is in opposition to other recognized Indian leaders such as Gandhi and Pandit Nehru. There would hardly be any direct political advantage for us in elevating Bose as chief of an Indian government, whereas this would meet with an unfavorable response in large parts of India ("Bose bought by the Axis Powers").

Regarding points II, III, and IV: Work in Afghanistan, the border area, and in India. [This line was underlined by Weizs cker. On the margin is the notation: "Please let me have this. W(eizs cker), Apr.12."]

These plans should be further pursued with Bose.

Regarding point V: Financial questions.

Bose should be promised generous financial support.

Regarding point VI: German military expedition to India.

This subject should not be discussed with Bose at the present time. If the situation should really at some time develop in a way that would make a German operation in India possible, it would not have to be the subject of a discussion in advance. [On May 4 (195/139150-52) Woermann noted that Bose had submitted a supplementary memorandum (195/139153-56) regarding the Indian question in relation to the recent events in Yugoslavia, Greece, and Iraq.]

WOERMANN

From: US Department of State. Documents on German Foreign Policy, 1918-1945. Series D (1937-1945). Vol. XII. The War Years February 1-June 22, 1941. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1962, 527-528.