Kashmir Dispute: U.S. Ambassador in India to U.S. Secretary of State, July 29, 1949
501.BC Kashmir/7-2949: Telegram
The [US] Ambassador in India (Henderson) to the [US] Secretary of State
SECRET PRIORITY - NEW DELHI, July 29,1949-10 a.m.
851. 1. I called on Bajpai, Director General Foreign affairs, [on the] twenty-eighth at his request. He said he wanted [to] discuss [a] serious matter. [The} Prime Minister and other members [of the] government [were] disturbed at reports received from returning Indian representatives and other Indian visitors in [the] US to [the] effect [that] US representatives to [the] UN from Austin down as well as Nimitz and his associates, seemed be forming impression[s] [that the] GOI was not acting in good faith re Kashmir, and through various subterfuges and evasions was endeavoring [to] avoid plebiscite. It seemed likely [that the] attitude [of the] USDel and other Americans connected with UN was [a] reflection [of the] attitude [of the] State Department. Furthermore, Birls [sic] had obtained [an] impression [that the] State Department seemed [to] regard India as primarily responsible for failure [to] achieve [a] truce agreement. He hoped that if [the] State Department had feelings [of] this kind it would express them frankly through me to him, pointing out at [the] same time what India had done or failed do to give rise to them. If really friendly understanding was to be maintained between India and [the] US, frankness was essential. He hoped [that the] US would not fall into British habit, taking [an] evasive attitude when unpleasant or disagreeable matters developed. Frank statement on part [of the] State Department of what it considered [to] be India's shortcoming re Kashmir would not be considered [an] intrusion since they were being invited. He would particularly like [to] know specific actions which [the] US felt India should take to demonstrate good faith. He was fearful that if [a] spirit of suspicion of Indian motives continued [to] be manifested by intimations and hints on [the] part [of] US officials and representatives, hoped-for effect of Nehru [to] visit would not be realized, and kind relations between our two countries for which he was wholeheartedly striving would not be achieved.
2. I replied I was not aware there had crystallized in [the] State Department [a] belief that India was not acting in good faith. It was only natural, however, that doubt should be raised in [the] minds of various members [of the] State Department and perhaps among various US representatives to UN re India's intentions because (a) India had not shown [the] kind of conciliatory attitude which was likely [to] promote speedy holding of plebiscite; (b) it was well-known that in certain Indian official circles, partition was preferred to plebiscite; (c) since India was in possession [of the] most desirable portions [of] Kashmir, postponement of plebiscite seemed more disadvantageous to Pakistan than India. I reminded him that on [a] number [of] occasions I had frankly told him how disturbed India's friends in Washington were at what seemed be [an] unconciliatory attitude [of] both India and Pakistan. Furthermore, [the] existence [of the] Kashmir problem was [the] cause of discouraging frustration to those officials [of the] American Government anxious [to] promote relations between [the] US and India and assist in promoting stability and prosperity in South Asia. For instance, it seemed almost hopeless for US [to] be able [to] lend really effective economic assistance to India so long as running sore of [the] Kashmir problem was eating into India's financial position and undermining political economic stability of South Asia. I had been somewhat embarrassed by my failure [to] receive from Washington replies [on] Defense Secretary Patel's questions re [the] possibility [of] receiving certain military equipment, et cetera. I did not know why these questions had not been answered. I was convinced, however, that [the] Department was postponing from day to day making decisions re them in hope [that the] breaking of [the] Kashmir deadlock between India and Pakistan would remove certain negative factors which could not be ignored at present. Men [in] Pakistan and India were at each others throats, [because the] US placed [a] virtual embargo [of] arms to both countries since it did not wish one [country to] use American equipment in fight against other. When cease-fire was announced, we lifted [the] embargo but subsequent developments have caused us [to] again hesitate lest military equipment given one country might be used against [the] other. These represent only two illustrations of handicaps imposed by [the] Kashmir deadlock on American officials working on South Asian matters. On other hand, it was difficult for [the] US, as I had pointed out in previous conversations to suggest specific conditions under which India might accept [a] truce since [the] US could not by-pass [the] UNCIP with suggestions of its own.
3. Bajpai again insisted it was important that [the] US talk with complete frankness with [the] GOI re this matter. Existence of [the] UNCIP or reference of [the] Kashmir dispute to LTN should not be allowed [to] interfere with direct diplomatic conversations. We must also consider relations between [the] US and India. Full understanding between our two countries achieved through direct talks should be of advantage to [the] UN.
4. I told him I would convey substance [of] our conversation to Washington and ask [the] Department [to] furnish me, for transmission to him, [a] frank statement replete with its many details might be considered appropriate and helpful.
5. He said he would be grateful if I would do so. He hoped my request would be couched in language which would not give offense since his approach to me was not to produce argument but [to] promote understanding. He was particularly anxious that [the] matter should be handled between himself and me and not through Madam Pandit since he feared her version of conversation might have [the] effect opposite to that which he was sure we both desired.
6. I realize [the] Department's difficulties in preparing [a] statement of [the] character desired by Bajpai. An utterly frank statement might mortally offend Nehru who is almost morbidly sensitive to criticism which might reflect on his motives or good faith. On [the] other hand, I feel we should not fail [to] register our disappointment at [the] attitude displayed by India re truce negotiations. Without questioning [the] good faith [of the] GOI, it might be possible [to] give instances in which India has assumed what seems to me [to] be a legalistic and technical attitude not likely [to] produce [the] kind of atmosphere in which friendly agreements are made. We should exercise care, however, not to present [the] kind of statement[s] which would invite argumentative reply and might lead us into profitless wrangling. In any event, it seems important statement[s] [should] be worded in such manner as [to] prepare [the] way for [the] President's contemplated message to Nehru on arbitration.
Pouched Srinagar for USDel.
HENDERSON
From: US Department of State. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949. Volume VI. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1977, 1726-28.