Kashmir Dispute: U.S. Ambassador in India to U.S. Secretary of State, June 11, 1949

501.BC Kashmir/6-1149 Telegram

The [US] Ambassador in India (Henderson) to the [US] Secretary of State

SECRET - NEW DELHI, June 11, 1949-noon. 

        662. (1) Recent events as well as our evaluation of Nehru's character and of influences surrounding him incline us to view that at present he is not sure that he wants an immediate truce agreement. He seems to be hesitating to take any steps just now which might lead towards [the] holding of [an] early plebiscite. We believe that certain advisers such as Bajpai who have special interest in India's international position are anxious that India should not gain [the] reputation of failing to live up to its commitments and that it should therefore go on towards [a] plebiscite provided [its] holding would be in circumstances which would not make them too vulnerable to attacks from nationalistic critics. Other advisers such as Ayyangar who have consistently opposed any concession are trying [to] persuade Nehru that [holding a] plebiscite in [the] near future in circumstances likely to prevail might lead to [the] loss [of] all Kashmir and disaster to him and [the] Congress Party. Nehru seems therefore to be veering between [the] desire for world acclaim as [a] great political figure willing to resort to peaceful methods in finding solution[s] [to] international disputes and [the] desire for popularity in India as [a] strong man who will not permit foreign pressure [to] persuade him [to] sacrifice national interests. During recent weeks [the] nationalistic group has been in ascendancy and [a] group interested in foreign relations which has no political backing whatsoever has been compelled [to] move with great caution. Nehru's sense [of] loyalty to [his] old comrade Abdullah strengthens [the] hand [of the] nationalistic group. In view [of] Nehru's character, we consider his recent unconciliatory and even provocative utterances as indicative of uncertainties rather than decisiveness. 

        (2) [The] Minimum goal [of the] nationalistic group is partition with India holding areas now occupied by it plus northern territory. Some ultra-nationalists would be quite prepared [to] enter into war with Pakistan in order [to] obtain all [of] Kashmir. They would hardly dare at this stage [to] make suggestion[s] [of] such [a] character to Nehru.

        (3) With [the] situation as it appears to be, we should exercise caution in endeavoring [to] bring pressure on Nehru, and such [pressure] as we might bring should be from his best source and couched in lofty language which would appeal to Nehru's amour propre.

        (4) If [the] UNCIP should decide [to] make [a] clear-cut formal suggestion to [the] GOI that it submit [the] matter of [a] truce to [an] arbitrator, and if it makes public this decision, occasion might be found for [the] President to make such an appeal through [the] Embassy. [The] British High Commissioner tells me that in response to inquiry from his government as to how [the] UK might best assist in prevailing on Nehru to agree to such an [sic] UNCIP suggestion, he was recommending an appeal from [Clement R.] Attlee through him to Nehru. Attlee frequently makes appeals to Nehru through this channel. He is, however, personally acquainted with Nehru. Although [the] President does not know Nehru personally, nevertheless an appeal from him parallel to the Attlee appeal might be helpful. Any appeal sent to India should, of course, accompany a similar appeal to Pakistan.

        Sent Department 662; pouched Karachi 22, Srinagar for USDel; repeated London.

        HENDERSON

From: US Department of State.  Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949.  Volume VI.  Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1977, 1719-20.