Kashmir Dispute: U.S. Ambassador in Pakistan to U.S. Secretary of State, April 10, 1948
501.BC/4-1048 Telegram
The [US] Ambassador in Pakistan (Alling) to the [US] Secretary of State
CONFIDENTIAL - KARACHI, April 10, 1948-l p.m.
213. Jinnah asked me to see him today and said he wished once again [to] discuss Kashmir, particularly Chinese resolution. I said I had no recent information on [the] subject but that toward end of March our attitude had been that although we could not vote for resolution in its then existing form since we thought it unacceptable [to] both parties, we did consider it offered framework within which fair settlement could be reached (Depintel March 25).
He said all Pakistan wanted was fair plebiscite but that impossible if Abdullah government continued in power and Indian troops remained in occupation. Pakistan had agreed to plebiscite only [to] save India's face since it was foregone conclusion overwhelming majority Kashmiris, if given free choice, would favor Pakistan. However, GOP in spirit accommodation was quite agreeable [to] go through formalities of vote. Jinnah considered [an] earlier draft [of the] resolution before UN as fair [to] both parties and could not understand "somersault" proposed by Chinese resolution. He attributed change to British wire-pulling instigated by Cripps whose operations, he said, had many "wheels within wheels". He hoped US would not be misled by British arguments that they knew situation here better than we did.
He inquired [as to] what did Pakistan get out of [the] Chinese resolution and replied it certainly did not get fair plebiscite which was sine qua non of settlement. It did receive honor of requesting tribesmen withdraw and asking 60,000 embattled Kashmiri troops lay down their arms. He said he was leaving for NWFP (Northwest Frontier Province) tomorrow and did anyone seriously believe he could while there, propose any such thing without being laughed out of town or thrown into lunatic asylum? Before he could induce Kashmiris and tribesmen [to] stop fighting, he must convince them there would be fair and honest plebiscite, and that he could not do since they knew meaning [of] Chinese resolution as well as he did.
He continued, suppose Chinese resolution passed and tribesmen and Kashmiris refused [to] stop fighting: he could not use force against them since he did not have such force. Suppose further he then said to India "I can't stop them. You come and do it." Did anyone suppose Indian Army was in position to take on half million tribesmen when well armed and officered British had not dared attempt such feat? He stressed Pakistan policy not oppressing tribesmen by force but endeavoring [to] civilize them through education, economic, and social development, and said he was convinced that was surest way keep them quiet. Using force against them in Kashmir dispute would open Pandora's box, result of which no one could foresee.
He ended by appealing to sense [of] fairness and justice influence rapid decision for really impartial plebiscite under really neutral control. Given such decision, he was confident he could influence tribesmen and Kashmiris [to] cease fighting. Given anything less he could accomplish nothing.
I reiterated throughout [the] discussion our desire for prompt and peaceful settlement on basis fair to all and stressed responsibility we all hope toward that end. His last word was [to] beg us not [to] be misled by UK.
Sent Department 213; repeated London 15, Delhi 31.
ALLING
From: US Department of State. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948. Volume V, part 1. Washington DC: Government Printing Office, 1975, 328-330.