501.BC Kashmir/9-2948: Telegram

The Acting [US] Secretary of State to the United States Representative on the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan (Huddle), at Geneva

SECRET - WASHINGTON, September 29, 1948-7 p.m.

1391. Kascom 35 for Huddle.

        1. Dept approves suggestion urtel 868 Sep 21 that informal discussions [in] Paris [with] GOP and GOI Dels be undertaken in effort obtain their acquiescence [to] Commission's resolution Aug 13 with such modifications as may be necessary. We believe that it would be desirable for any efforts made by US GADel along these lines be accompanied by similar approaches by UN reps [in] Paris [and] other members [of] Com. We feel that even though Com plans [to] initiate preparation [of] its report to SC Sep 30, informal efforts [in] Paris should be continued as outlined until such time it is clearly evident Com's report must be negative thereby necessitating formal SC debate.

        2. For your guidance and that GADel we believe that most practicable course [to] pursue during these informal talks would be [to] endeavor [to] persuade GOI and GOP reps [to] accept brief outline [of] plebiscite arrangements under UN supervision as supplement [to] Aug 13 resolution. Dept inclined [to] believe GOP attitude conditioned by deep-seated fear [of] Indian aggression which leads [to] GOP insistence on safeguards after withdrawal [of] Pakistan troops along lines Part B SC res April 21. After preliminary examination [of] SC Document S/995 Sep 15, Dept questions whether GOI response Coms proposals points 2 and 3 GOI letter Aug 20 fully compatible with sections IB, II B I and 2, and III Coms Aug 13 res. Although in view [of] Korbel's letter Aug 25 Com probably unable [to] reverse its position [on] this matter, we feel GOP attitude re plebiscite should not necessarily be considered as rejection Coms proposals and that every effort should be made with GOP and GOI reps to indicate that Com has not yet closed door on this point.

        3. Nature Coms report will no doubt be influenced to some degree by outcome in formal talks [in] Paris. If such talks fail [to] produce definitive results, please endeavor [to] persuade Com [to] include in its report specific recommendations for SC action, in order [to] provide new terms [of] reference for Com or any other UN authority that may replace it. SC resolution 21 April contains general proposals cease-fire and truce and more detailed proposals for plebiscite in Part B. Coms efforts to date have resulted in elaboration and clarification [of] plans for cease-fire and truce. It would appear desirable for Com, building on these bases, to submit specific recommendations to SC covering cease-fire, truce and plebiscite, modifying both SC resolution and Coms proposals as necessary in light [of] positions taken by GOI and GOP during negotiations. Diminution [of] military action [in] Kashmir due to winter conditions may offer best opportunity place such plan in operation and plebiscite might be scheduled [for] May 1949 prior to weather permitting resumption [of] military activity.

        4. As to SC action on Coms recommendations, choice appears [to] lie between (1) taking further action under Chapter VI (2) adopting recommendations as provisional measures under Art 40 (3) issuing cease-fire order under Art 40 and recommending truce and plebiscite arrangements under Chapter VI. Pls indicate your views and discuss GADel. We have in mind that whatever course decided upon it might be desirable Com submit its views on this as well as recommendations on substance.

        5. Dept wishes [to] stress importance [of] tone and approach [in] Coms report. Wherever justifiably permissible, criticism should be directed equally against both sides. For example, note might be taken of GOI military campaign in Kashmir last spring as factor in present situation. In light [of] continued strained GOI-GOP relations and recent reports from several sources that Pak officials sincerely fear military invasion Pak from India, Dept somewhat concerned [with] New Delhi radio report that Com has published letter to GOP placing onus on GOP for break-down negotiations. If report [is] correct, Dept feels GOI may interpret Com's attitude as moral victory and as possible justification [of] military action against Pak. In view [of] this and in view [of] desirability [of] general support for Coms recommendations in SC and importance [of] acceptance or acquiescence by both parties, we feel it would be [a] tactical mistake for Coms report [to] seek place on either side major blame for lack [of] agreement.

        Keep Dept closely advised [of the] development [of] thinking in Com.

        LOVETT

From: US Department of State. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948. Volume V, part 1. Washington DC: Government Printing Office, 1975, 412-413.