501.BC Kashmir/9-l048: Telegram

The United States Representative on the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan (Huddle) to the [US] Secretary of State

RESTRICTED - NEW DELHI, September 10, 1948-11 a.m.

         809. Comkas 37 (information GA Delegation). While neither Pakistan nor India official or private circles or press ever indicated confidence, success [of] mediation efforts [of] commission, general feeling [of] disappointment sensed [in] Karachi and also seems reflected by press from India because Kashmir problem no nearer solution.

        In its acceptance [of] commission's resolution India wins first round but India was not committed re plebiscite arrangements. India flatly rejected SC plebiscite proposals and indicated plebiscite could take place only as India dictated. Commission's hope was that with armies out of Kashmir, India's position might be modified and plebiscite terms could be agreed upon. Pakistan claims to want plebiscite but not on Indian terms and position now seems to be that Pakistan army will hold positions in Kashmir until plebiscite arranged or failing that would not evade military action to gain Kashmir and its Muslim peoples for Pakistan.

        Pakistan Government, however, seems unhappy with prospect. A prominent official made special personal visit to me and also to Colban Wednesday further [to] explain point of view [of] his government, to assure me of Pakistan confidence in commission and said in playing down some of terms [of] Pakistan reply to commission that Pakistan would be satisfied with any plebiscite arrangements which had approval of commission. But suspicion must remain that Pakistan [by] protracting Kashmir settlement [is] hoping [to] profit by developments [of] Hyderabad dispute which has been seriously troubling India.

        Nehru's statement to Parliament September 7 on Kashmir issue charged Pakistan army invaded Kashmir, termed invasion "aggression of Pakistan on Indian union territory" and added, "country that was an aggressor nation according to its own showing now rejected and  refused proposal for cease-fire or put forward conditions tantamount to refusal." Nehru repeated previous charges that Pakistan['s] case [is] built upon falsehood and deceit.

        Zafrullah responded [to] Nehru at press conference September 8 [and] gave spirited defense [of] Pakistan invasion [of] Kashmir saying Pakistan [is] not bound under any moral or international obligation to inform India and [had] no occasion [to] inform SC which had already committed Kashmir case to commission. Zafrulla said Pakistan [is] under no obligation international or otherwise that prevents her from sending her troops into Kashmir, basing Pakistan position on non-reconciliation legality accession to India. Otherwise he rehashed for most part old controversy.

        Have requested Karachi forward full reports Zafrulla's press statement for it should be studied as forming probable theme [in] his presentation to SC if Kashmir [is] placed on agenda.

        After first shock and 24 hours silence Karachi Dawn and Observer broke out September 9 in rash editorial [of] misrepresentation and distortion [of the] facts [of the] situation. India is main object of attack of commission but that does not improve matters.

        On return to Delhi ninth, commission had interview with Nehru and Bajpai and informed them personally re Pakistan's qualified acceptance which amounts to rejection its proposals. Nehru [was] plainly disappointed [with] result. Commission asked whether his government would consider first, simple cease-fire; if not, second, council or supplement, to agreement, giving Pakistan some assurance re plebiscite such as requested by Pakistan; and third, whether India would be willing [to] engage [in] conferences with Pakistan to break present stalemate. Nehru pointed out futility [of] conversations at present stage. He apparently ruled out cease-fire but seems to have thought possibility [of] working out supplement to commission's proposals to cover plebiscite might just possibly be worthy further consideration. In any event, he did not flatly reject commission's suggestion.

        Conclusion, however, seems almost inevitable that India and Pakistan will not come together on mutually satisfactory terms now; that matter may again have to be aired SC; that SC will have to find some means whereby real pressure will have to be exerted on one or both disputants if peaceful settlement is to be arrived at; and that if this is not possible India and Pakistan will have to be left to settle problem in own way with prospect of disaster.

        Suggestion Comkas 29 that SC appoint prominent moderator might be seriously considered. New terms of reference should be adopted calling upon India and Pakistan as members of UN confer together with him and agreed [to] terms [of] settlement, at same time calling for cease-fire and truce agreement as prescribed by commission.

        Sent Department 809, Department pass Paris.

        [HUDDLE]

From: US Department of State. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948. Volume V, part 1. Washington DC: Government Printing Office, 1975, 377-379.