Kashmir Dispute: U.S. Charg  in Pakistan to U.S. Secretary of State, January 1, 1948

745.45F/1-148 Telegram

The [US] Charg  in Pakistan (Lewis) to the [US] Secretary of State

SECRET IMMEDIATE - KARACHI, January 1, 1948-9 a.m.

        1. Have talked with Jinnah, Liaquat Ali Khan, Sir Zafrullah Khan, Secretary General Mohammad Ali, and Ikramullah and nowhere have detected any trace of anxiety or nervousness such as seems [to] exist in Delhi on [the] Kashmir question, although profound annoyance is felt that GOI is using [the] Kashmir affair as [an] excuse for not making good its commitments on cash balances, failure to pay, which under [the] terms [of the] recent agreement places GOP in [a] difficult fiscal position, as presumably desired by GOI (Deptel 218, December 26, London's 53, December 29).

        [The] GOP answered GOI note night before last. In nearly two hours review of Pakistan's relations with India, Mohammad Ali and Ikramullah told me yesterday [that the] GOI note contained no ultimatum or time limit for reply but did contain some limits of trouble for Pakistan if GOP did not cease alleged aiding and abetting [of] Azad Kashmir Government and raiders. In that connection, these officials said while Pakistan's sympathies were with Azad Government, GOP was not aiding Azad movement and could not if it would stop uprising against Kashmir Government and the struggle against GOI troops in Kashmir without revolution in Pakistan.

        Mohammad Ali, who participated in talks with GOI said GOP position in all these talks was that while welcoming in principle plebiscite in Kashmir, GOP must have assurances [of] neutral administration preceding and during plebiscite. Given such administration, GOP would exercise every possible influence with Azad Government and raiders to raise activities and abide by plebiscite result. If neutral administration cannot be agreed upon between GOI and GOP, as seemingly it cannot since every proposal [in] that direction by [the] GOP has been rejected by GOI, Pakistan will gladly agree [to let the] UN Security Council set up appropriate administration with safeguards for honest vote and conduct [of the] plebiscite. If GOI [is] unwilling [to] accept [the] latter procedure, GOP will counter any action by GOI in placing before SC [the] question [of] alleged guilt [of] Pakistan in supporting belligerent activities against Kashmir by asking [the] SC [to] conduct investigation [of] all relations between the two Dominions including Junagadh matter. This is [the] substance [of] GOP reply notes.

        [The] GOP [is] thoroughly convinced [that] Kashmir's accession to India and sending of GOI troops to Kashmir is only part of GOI's deliberately planned policy dating from acceptance of partition, to strangle and destroy Pakistan in successive stages, and will support that conviction before [the] SC if GOI carries its case to [the] SC in [the] form indicated in its last note to GOP.

        Department, repeat to London if desired. Delhi informed.

        LEWIS

From: US Department of State. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948. Volume V, part 1. Washington DC: Government Printing Office, 1975, 265-266.